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1 Introduction
The level of risk aversion is a key determinant of economic behavior. It determines for
example the degree of insurance households buy, is decisive for their assets allocation
decisions, and is a key determinant of firms’ cost of capital. Research on the level of
risk aversion has therefore been at the center of economics in general and of finance in
particular. The question of how to measure the level of risk aversion has been addressed
using quite different research methodologies. Laboratory experiments infer the level of
risk aversion from individuals’ choices between simple lotteries. Empirical studies, on
the other hand, infer the average risk aversion of market participants from risk premia
of observed stock prices. The two approaches do not lead to similar estimates of the
level of risk aversion, however: The degree of risk aversion found in individual data is
typically significantly lower than that found in market data.
The purpose of this paper is to reconcile the results of these two research method-
ologies. For at least the following two reasons this task is not immediate. First, the two
research methodologies work with different auxiliary assumptions. Second, the aggrega-
tion from individual decisions to market averages has to be addressed.
We argue that the main reason for the different estimates is differences in auxiliary
assumptions about how agents apply “narrow framing” when evaluating risky prospects
(see for instance Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Re-
delmeier and Tversky, 1992; Read et al., 1999). An econometrician must make assump-
tions about not only the degree to which agents take “background wealth” into account,
but also about to what extent they evaluate a given risky prospect independently from
other risky prospects. While laboratory studies commonly assume narrow framing, this
is typically not done in studies that rely on market data.
The intuition for our main result is as follows. Not integrating background wealth
reduces the risk aversion found—both in the interpretation of stock market data and of
experimental data. The first claim is true because not integrating background wealth
means stock investments are evaluated by their dividends, which are more volatile than
consumption. Hence, evaluating stocks according to the dividends they pay out increases
the volatility of the stochastic discount factor (SDF), which is an upper bound for the
Sharpe ratio of asset returns (Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991).1 The second claim
follows because the size of the stakes of lotteries does not matter in experiments when
background wealth is not integrated. For a standard utility function, this reduces the
1This is observed by Hagiwara and Herce (1997). They find a coefficient of relative risk aversion of
about three in annual data (1889–1994) from the Standard & Poor’s U.S. stock price index.
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risk aversion needed to explain observed individual behavior.
Table 1 summarizes the main results of our paper. It reports the degree of risk
aversion we estimate from stock market data and experiments, with and without narrow
framing. It is apparent that the level of risk aversion is higher in the market than in the
laboratory when narrow framing is assumed in the interpretation of experiments, but
assumed absent in the interpretation of stock market data. When the assumption of
narrow framing is applied consistently, the degree of risk aversion coincides. Similarly, if
narrow framing is assumed in the analysis of stock market data, but not in experiments,
then the level of risk aversion in the laboratory is higher than that found in market data.
Table 1: Estimates of risk aversion from stock market data and experiments, with or
without integration of background wealth.
Market data Experiments
Integrated 10–20 10–20
Not integrated 2.25 3.22
A second contribution is to establish that assumptions about individuals’ tendency
for narrow framing carry over to the representative agent in a Rubinstein-Lucas style
pure exchange economy (Rubinstein, 1974; Lucas, 1978). Estimates of risk aversion from
stock market data are typically carried out using this construct. This result is important,
because it implies that, ceteris paribus, estimates of risk aversion from stock market data
and data from experiments are consistent only if similar assumptions are made about
the agents’ degree of narrow framing. The qualification ceteris paribus refers to the
possibility that individuals’ behavior is different in the laboratory and in real financial
markets—an issue we do not address in this paper.
Our paper contributes to various strands of literature. Focussing on the diagonal (10–
20, 3.22) of Table 1, our paper reproduces the explanation of the equity premium puzzle
found by Hagiwara and Herce (1997). Moreover, we share with Barberis and Huang
(2008) the idea of narrow framing. Barberis and Huang (2008) use narrow framing to
argue that investors are loss averse, i.e. that losses affect utility at a higher rate than
gains. These ideas lead them to suggest that the standard consumption-based SDF is
augmented by a term that captures loss aversion. This extra term provides sufficient
variation in their SDF to explain the equity premium puzzle with a low coefficient of
risk aversion. Note that our conclusion from the same observation is to restrict the SDF
to consumption proxies that are more specific than the standard notions of per capita
consumption. Our model does therefore not rely on an extra term that provides more
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freedom to pick up otherwise unexplained variation.2
A novelty of our paper is however also to also point out the diagonal (2.25, 10–20)
of Table 1. If narrow framing is applied to stock market data but not to experiments a
reverse equity premium puzzle obtains. Hence we claim that the equity premium puzzle
may not only be an empirical question but can also be perceived as a conceptual one.
In Section 2 we consider experimental evidence on the level of risk aversion and show
it depends on the way background wealth is treated. We then develop a simple utility
model in Section 3 that allows for various degrees of narrow framing, show our aggre-
gation result, and calibrate the utility model to market data by computing consistent
levels of risk aversion for various degrees of narrow framing. We use these results to
infer the degree of narrow framing that makes the risk aversion inferred from market
data consistent with that from experimental data. Section 4 concludes.
2 Risk Aversion in Experimental Studies
Determining an agent’s risk aversion is a well researched topic in experimental economics
and the psychology literature. It is well known that questions like the following get
more robust answers than asking for certainty equivalents, or for instance using unequal
probabilities.3
Question 1: Consider a fair lottery where you have a 50% chance of doubling your
income, and a 50% chance of losing a certain percentage, say x% of your income. What
is the highest loss x that you would be willing to incur in order to agree taking part in
this lottery?
Barsky et al. (1997) report that the average answer in such an experiment is about
x = 23%. What does this answer imply, assuming participants maximize expected utility
with constant relative risk aversion?
Suppose first that the decision problem is perceived as: Find an x such that the
utility of the lottery and the status quo income are the same, that is
0.5
(2y)1−γ
1− γ + 0.5
((1− x)y)1−γ
1− γ =
(y)1−γ
1− γ ,
2The effect is similar to any approach that introduces a risk factor in the SDF that is more volatile
than consumption, for instance as wealth in combination with per capita consumption (as in Epstein
and Zin, 1991) or wealth as the only risk factor (as in Bakshi and Chen, 1996). It is unclear though, how
to project these inherent multi-period models onto the one-period lotteries used in the experiments.
3We refer to Harrison and Rutstro¨m (2008) for a thorough comparison of different risk aversion
elicitation procedures in the laboratory. Similar questions are reported in Barsky et al. (1997), Mankiw
and Zeldes (1991), Shefrin (1999) and Gollier (2001).
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where y is the income referred to in Question 1. Then x = 23% reveals a relative
risk aversion of γ = 3.22. This is somewhat higher than levels argued on normative
grounds. Arrow (1971) argues for a constant relative risk aversion of about one.4 A
participant with unit risk aversion would, however, have to answer x = 50%, which is
clearly an outlier among participants (Barsky et al., 1997, among others). Hence, the
experiment seems to reveal that the average decision maker is more risk averse than
the ideal Arrow (1971) decision maker. This claim is commonly made in the literature.
Samuelson (1991), for example, compares the unit relative risk aversion case to the one
with a relative risk aversion of two, and finds the latter to be the “more realistic case.”
On the other hand, assuming a constant relative risk aversion in the range 10–20, which
is necessary to explain the equity premium, as reported in Table 1, implies an x in the
range 3–7%, which is also an outlier among laboratory observations. From the latter
observation, Shefrin (1999) and many others conclude that the equity premium is “a
puzzle,” since the risk aversion necessary to explain observed equity returns is far off
from observed risk aversion in experimental research.
The validity of the above argument depends, however, on the validity of auxiliary
assumptions about participants’ tendency for narrow framing. Using the classic inter-
pretation of the expected utility model, one should not separate the lottery payoffs from
background wealth and should instead evaluate every lottery based on its effect on to-
tal wealth, as pointed out early on by Mossin (1968, p. 215): “. . . a formulation of the
decision problem [. . . ] in terms of portfolio rate of return tends to obscure an important
aspect of the problem, namely, the role of the absolute size of the portfolio.” If the in-
come y in Question 1 is not understood by participants to refer to their total wealth, and
one maintains the classic interpretation of the decision problem participants are really
solving the problem
0.5
(w + 2y)1−γ
1− γ + 0.5
(w + (1− x)y)1−γ
1− γ =
(w + y)1−γ
1− γ , (1)
where w is the participant’s background wealth, unrelated to the experiment.
Figure 1 shows risk aversion as a function of background wealth relative to the size
of the stake, using the average answer to Question 1. The graph shows that x = 23%
is consistent with a risk aversion of 10–20 if the background wealth is in the range of
4Empirical studies on the equity risk premium do not seem to take the theoretical point of Arrow too
seriously. Maybe this is because, in any applied study, the range of payoffs is bounded so that going to
the limit of extreme payoffs, as Arrow does in his argument, is out of the range in which the observations
are made. Luenberger (1996) and Hellwig (1995) suggest consistency with Arrow’s argument can be
maintained by postulating a unit relative risk aversion for extreme payoffs only.
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Figure 1: Risk Aversion and Relative Background Wealth
three to six times the participants’ perceived income, when interpreting Question 1 in
the way of (1). This size of background wealth is reasonable, as it should include the
participant’s income, the value of her house, land and human capital. Figure 2 shows
real and financial assets of U.S. households in percentage of their disposable income
(source: OECD, taken from Datastream). The representative household’s total assets
constituted between 550% and 750% of its income during 1985–2004. Notice that these
figures serve only as a lower bound for w in a Rubinstein-Lucas type economy, since w
should represent the price at which the representative agent can buy the entire economy.
Figure 2: Household Data on Real and Financial Assets
We have so far considered narrow framing by the degree of integration of background
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wealth. Classic finance theory implies that optimizing ‘rational’ agents should not con-
sider a risky prospect in isolation from other risky prospects, as pointed out by for
example Campbell and Viceira (2002, page 10): “More specifically, we believe that any
normative model should judge a portfolio by its total value, rather than by the values of
the individual assets it contains, and should ultimately be based on the standard of living
that the portfolio supports.” Kahneman and Tversky (1979), and many others, have
observed from laboratory experiments, however, that individuals typically use ‘narrow
frames’ and separate different lotteries from each other. Hence from a prospect theory
perspective the first interpretation of the answer to Question 1 is the correct one and
the implied relative risk aversion is in the range of two to four.
If individuals’ tendency for narrow framing aggregates, however, and one assumes
(no) narrow framing at the level of individuals, one should also interpret stock market
data in the context of (no) narrow framing. As we show below, the degree of risk aversion
implied by stock market data is in the same range of small (large) numbers when one
assumes (no) narrow framing. This is our main point.
One may argue that the above argument is invalid because of inappropriate designs of
experiments. For instance Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) claims that “It seems possible
in such experiments to choose the size of the gamble so that any value of [risk aversion]
seems unreasonable.” Their claim is based on the observation that the average answer
to Question 1 does not depend on the size of the gamble, and that changing background
wealth changes risk aversion. The argument assumes, however, a specific form of par-
ticipants’ utility functions. Rabin (2000) makes a rigorous argument for the observation
of Kandel and Stambaugh, but arrives at the opposite conclusion. While risk aversion
estimates in the standard expected utility model vary wildly between low and high stake
lotteries, the experimental data yields reasonable estimates when background wealth
is not integrated. Recent experimental results support Rabin’s point of view. Post et
al. (2008) analyze participation in simple TV lotteries that are played in 140 countries
across the world.5 Lottery stakes can reach as high as 1.5 million U.S. Dollars. They
find that the average degree of risk aversion is about three, and is independent of the
size of the stakes.
5See also Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) for an analysis of Italian TV game shows.
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3 Risk Aversion in Stock Market Studies
Based on the observations in Section 2, the challenge is to confirm if the low risk aversion
observed in experimental data matches the risk aversion obtained from stock market
data when the latter is analyzed using comparable auxiliary assumptions. We there-
fore proceed to set up a model of individuals with various degree of narrow framing,
demonstrate that it aggregates, and calibrate the representative agent’s risk aversion to
observed equity returns.
Consider a discrete time model, t = 1, 2, . . . , T , with k = 1, .., K assets. Let pkt
be the price and Dkt the dividends paid by asset k in period t. Investors are denoted
i = 1, 2, ..., I, have an initial endowment of assets θi0 ∈ RK+ , and an exogenous flow of
income yit.
6 The aggregate endowment is normalized, so that
∑I
i=1 θ
i,k
0 = 1 for all k.
To allow different degrees of narrow framing while maintaining tractable notation we
introduce the following consumption ‘goods’ that individuals may derive utility from:
The income good ci,0t = y
i,0
t , the investment k good c
i,k
t = D
k
t θ
i,k
t−1 + p
k
t
(
θi,kt−1 − θi,kt
)
, and
the portfolio good ci,dt :=
∑K
k=1 c
i,k
t —the latter two including both dividend and capital
gains. Similarly, the aggregate consumption good is denoted by ci,at :=
∑K
k=0 c
i,k
t , while
cit = (c
i,0
t , c
i,1
t , . . . , c
i,K
t ) denotes the vector of the consumption goods.
Investors are homogeneous with respect to their utility functions u : RK+1+ → R,7
respectively u : RK+1++ → R,8 and discount factors β, such that
Ut(c
i) = Et
{
T∑
τ=t
βτu(c
i
τ )
}
, for all ci ∈ Rn+ (respectively ci ∈ Rn++). (2)
We consider the standard model with no narrow framing, as well as two sequentially
more severe cases of narrow framing.
(i) Integration of all payoffs:
u(ci,0τ , ..., c
i,K
τ ) = v(c
i,a
τ )
6We use standard assumptions about measurability and information filtrations throughout.
7We make this assumption for simplicity of exposition. It is possible to extend our aggregation
results to heterogeneous time and risk preference, as for example in Theorem 14.1 of Shefrin (2008).
8As we see below, the restriction of the domain to strictly positive numbers is important if the agent
has unit relative risk aversion.
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(ii) Separation of portfolio payoffs:
u(ci,0τ , ..., c
i,K
τ ) = v(c
i,0
τ ) + v(c
i,d
τ )
(iii) Separation of all payoffs:
u(ci,0τ , ..., c
i,K
τ ) =
K∑
k=0
v(ci,kτ )
Agents with preferences described in (i) take background wealth into account (as
well as possibly other factors) because their decision problem—described below—can be
reformulated in terms of a Bellman equation with current wealth as a state variable.
One may want to specify a separate Bernoulli utility for ci,0 = yi in (ii) and (iii) to stay
closer to the analysis in Section 2. How we specify utility from ci,0 = yi is not important
for pricing purposes and thereby estimation of risk aversion, however, as will become
clear shortly.
One can motivate the extreme case of asset specific mental accounts, as in (iii), by the
robust finding that investors underdiversify. Friend and Blume (1975) study a sample of
17 056 accounts of individual investors. They find that 34.1% hold only one stock, 50%
hold at most two stocks, and only 10% hold more than 10 stocks (See also Kelly, 1995;
Odean, 1999; Polkovnichenko, 2005; Goetzman and Kumar, 2004).
Investors are price takers, and are faced with the following problem at date t:
max
θi
Ut(c) s.t. c
i,a
τ ≤ yiτ +
K∑
k=1
Dkτ θ
i,k
τ−1 +
K∑
k=1
pkτ
(
θi,kτ−1 − θi,kτ
)
, τ = t, . . . , T − 1. (3)
A financial market equilibrium for this economy consists of a process of asset prices p
and I consumption processes ci, i = 1, . . . , I such that every consumption process solves
(3) and all markets clear, i.e.
∑
i θ
i,k
t = 1 and
∑
i c
i,a
t =
∑
i y
i
t+
∑K
k=1D
k
t , t = 1, 2, . . . , T .
We show in Appendix B that the equilibrium prices can also be obtained from the
decision problem of a representative agent who inherits the degree of narrow framing in
(i)–(iii). Because the representative agent has to hold all assets and consume all income
the possible first order conditions become:
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(i) Integration of all payoffs—utility from per capita consumption:
pkt = v
′(cat )
−1βtEt
{
v′(cat+1)(D
k
t+1 + p
k
t+1)
}
where cat =
I∑
i=1
yit +
K∑
k=1
Dkt ∀k, t. (4)
(ii) Separation of asset payoffs from income:
pkt = v
′(cdt )
−1βtEt
{
v′(cdt+1)(D
k
t+1 + p
k
t+1)
}
where cdt =
K∑
k=1
Dkt ∀k, t. (5)
(iii) Separation of all payoffs:
pkt = v
′(ckt )
−1βtEt
{
v′(ckt+1)(D
k
t+1 + p
k
t+1)
}
where ckt = D
k
t ∀k, t. (6)
It follows that the SDF in the case of constant relative risk aversion can be expressed
for all three cases as
βt
(
c∗t+1
c∗t
)−γ
, for ∗ = a, d, k. (7)
Table 2 shows that Hansen-Jagannathan bounds (Hansen and Jagannathan, 1991)
for model (ii) are in line with the observed Sharpe ratio of 0.3459 for a risk aversion in
the interval 2.25–2.50 when agents derive utility from aggregate dividends, compared to
the less volatile per capita consumption in model (i).9 Narrow framing in the sense of
(ii) thus makes the market inferred risk aversion consistent with the experimental data.
The extent or nature of narrow framing is not known, and it may be that agents
keep separate mental accounts for each asset payoff, as in (iii). The asset specific SDFs
are more volatile than the SDF based on aggregate dividends because dividends are not
perfectly correlated. Consequently, the corresponding Hansen-Jagannathan bounds are
in line with the observed Sharpe ratio of 0.3459 for an even lower risk aversion—not
higher than γ = 0.5 (Table 3, in Appendix A).
Recall that the laboratory evidence on risk aversion indicate a value of γ of about
three. This means that narrow framing that evaluate aggregate risky payoffs (model (ii),
with γ about 2.5) fits the laboratory evidence better than narrow framing at the level
of individual payoffs (model (iii), with γ ≤ 0.5).
9This is essentially the same effect as that observed by Bakshi and Chen (1996) and Epstein and Zin
(1991), when the SDF is a function of wealth—which is also more volatile than consumption.
10
Table 2: Hansen-Jagannathan Bounds Based on Annual Returns Since 1889
Risk aversion Consumption SDF Aggregate Dividend SDF
1.00 0.0358 0.1260
1.50 0.0540 0.2014
2.00 0.0723 0.2893
2.25 0.0816 0.3391
2.50 0.9090 0.3935
2.75 0.1002 0.4530
3.00 0.1096 0.5181
3.22 0.1180 0.5805
4.00 0.1479 0.8640
5.00 0.1873 1.3082
10.00 0.4084 5.2337
15.00 0.6889 7.4788
20.00 1.0560 8.1135
The SDF in column two is based on per capita consumption, while the SDF in column three is based
on aggregate dividends accruing to the S&P 500. The S&P 500 Sharpe ratio is 0.3459, when using the
one year riskless rate (source: Online data provided by Robert Shiller)
4 Conclusion
Estimates of risk aversion from experiments are typically lower than those based on
observed market prices. We demonstrate that the estimates become consistent if the
data is interpreted using consistent assumptions about narrow framing: either no narrow
framing in both settings, or some degree of narrow framing in both settings. If one
postulates a high level of risk aversion, to make the standard consumption-based model
consistent with the observed Hansen-Jagannathan bounds (typically referred to as “the
equity premium puzzle,” starting with Mehra and Prescott, 1985), then interpreting
the experimental data within the same framework leads to similarly high levels of risk
aversion. If one postulate instead that individuals have narrow frames, as typically
assumed in laboratory experiments, then we find that a similar extent of narrow framing
by a representative agent implies Hansen-Jagannathan bounds that are consistent with
observed market prices at low levels of risk aversion. Thus, with a consistent application
of mental accounting in both settings there is no disagreement between market- and
experiment-based estimates of risk aversion.
We hope that this note encourages further work to bridge experimental analysis
and market analysis. For example, other data sets should be considered and also more
elaborate utility models that have recently been developed. In particular, this note does
not offer an answer to what level of narrow framing investors actually apply, and to what
extent subjects’ behavior in the laboratory carries mirrors behavior by real investors.
11
Appendix
A Evidence from individual stocks
Table 3: Sharpe ratios and Hansen-Jagannathan bounds for cash-dividend paying single
stocks in the S&P 100, based on annual data ranging from 1973 to 2005. Column one
lists the firms that pay cash dividends to their investors. Column two reports the Sharpe
ratio with respect to the one year interest rate from Robert Shiller. Column three gives
the bounds on the Sharpe ratio imposed by the SDF (7), when consumption equals the
individual firm’s dividends accruing to the single stocks. The risk aversion is γ = 0.5 for
the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds column. Data is taken from Datastream.
Firm Sharpe ratio H-J bound (γ = 0.5)
Alcoa 0.1496 1.4748
Allegheny Technologies 0.2577 1.3468
Altria Group 0.0717 1.3447
American Electric Power 0.2606 2.7210
American Express -0.0518 1.6604
American International Group 0.1667 2.0281
Anheuser-Busch 0.3113 1.5272
AT&T (delisted on 21/11/05) 0.1741 1.8193
Avon Products -0.1091 1.6548
Baker Hughes 0.0912 2.1958
Bank of America -0.1685 1.7244
Baxter International 0.3532 1.8626
Black & Decker 0.1959 1.5114
Boeing 0.0460 1.5100
Bristol Myers Squibb 0.2461 1.6350
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 0.3017 1.4064
Campbell Soup 0.2102 1.6531
Cigna 0.1400 1.4744
Citigroup 0.3687 1.4225
Coca Cola 0.3850 1.5730
Colgate-Palm 0.2436 1.7702
Delta Air Lines 0.2819 1.5904
Dow Chemical 0.0329 1.3124
Du Pont de Nemours 0.1199 1.4771
Eastman Kodak 0.1851 2.1841
Entergy 0.2935 2.4352
Exelon -0.1547 1.6073
Exxon Mobil 0.1314 1.7538
Ford Motor 0.3205 1.3830
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General Dynamics 0.1822 1.4273
General Electric 0.1896 1.5351
General Motors 0.2663 1.6609
Gilette (delisted on 20/10/05) -0.2211 1.6583
Halliburton 0.2434 1.4235
Heinz 0.1532 1.8242
Hewlett-Packard 0.2116 1.4290
Home Depot 0.3549 1.5758
Honeywell International 0.4737 1.6266
Intel 0.0082 1.4191
International Business Machines 0.5629 1.2927
International Paper 0.1310 1.7509
Johnson & Johnson 0.1143 1.4640
J.P. Morgan Chase 0.2596 1.5224
Limited Brands 0.3611 1.4288
May Department Stores (delisted on 14/09/05) 0.4110 1.4893
McDonalds 0.1697 1.8132
Medtronic 0.1740 1.6205
Merck 0.3922 1.2845
Merrill Lynch 0.2123 1.7123
OfficeMax 0.0913 2.0470
PepsiCo 0.4637 1.3637
Pfizer 0.2672 1.5403
Procter & Gamble 0.3217 1.7954
Radioshack 0.1651 1.8107
Raytheon 0.1772 1.6750
Rockwell Auto,mation 0.2357 1.8199
Sara Lee 0.0651 1.6433
AT&T 0.2318 1.5135
Schlumberger 0.2257 1.7056
Sears Roebuck 0.1735 1.9559
Southern -0.2514 2.2301
Texas Instruments 0.0680 1.3499
Tyco International 0.2321 1.7204
Unysis 0.2480 1.2928
United Technologies 0.1540 1.7664
Verizon Communications 0.2749 1.7346
Wal-Mart Stores 0.1932 1.4135
Wells Fargo 0.2480 1.6679
Weyerhaeuser 0.3638 1.5376
Xerox 0.2684 1.4323
3M 0.1081 1.7750
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B Pareto Efficiency and Aggregation
In this section we show that financial market equilibria are Pareto efficient, that asset
prices must satisfy the first order condition of the decision problem of a so called ”rep-
resentative investor,” and that the utility function of the representative investor inherits
the degree of narrow framing from individual investors. The results assume complete
markets, and is based on arguments that goes back to Negishi (1960), later introduced
into finance by Constantinides (1982). Our derivation is based on Magill and Quinzii
(1996), and does not reproduce parts that are invariant to our formulation. We rather
point out the necessary departures caused by narrow framing.
To this end let us first compare the case of separation of income from asset payoffs
that are integrated in one account (case (ii)), to the standard case without any separation
(case (i)). For the latter case we know from Theorem 25.7 in Magill and Quinzii (1996)
that equilibria are Pareto-efficient and that there exist some positive weights νi such that
the utility of the representative agent can be obtained by (Magill and Quinzii, 1996, p.
275)10
UR(WR) = max
ci
∑
i
νiU(ci) s.t.
∑
i
ci,at =
∑
i
yit +
K∑
k=1
Dkt = W
R
t , ∀ t = 1, ..., T.
Moreover, the additive separable structure of individual utility functions is inherited
by the representative investor. This follows because one can interchange the summation
across agents with that across time periods and across states of the information filtration,
in the definition of the utility of the representative investor. Still, this result assumes:
(A) U i are infinitely differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satisfy
Inada conditions (marginal utility tends to infinity as consumption tends to zero.)
(B) In every node ξ of the information filtration the matrix of subsequent dividends
[D1(ξ), . . . , DK(ξ)] has rank equal to the number of subsequent nodes.
Note that with expected utility functions of the constant relative risk aversion type
assumption (A) is satisfied. Moreover, given assumption (B), markets are complete for
a generic set of exogenous wealth yi, i = 1, ..., I (Magill and Quinzii, 1996).
10The solution to this maximization problem exists since the individual utility functions are assumed
to be continuous and the choice variable ci,a are bounded below by 0 and bounded above by the
constraint given in the decision problem.
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Case (ii) differs from the textbook case (i) by the utility from income being separated
from the utility from asset payoffs (dividends and capital gains). Since only assets
are traded in the model, the income is exogeneously given and does not affect Pareto
efficiency. Hence the utility function of the representative investor is again a weighted
average of the individual utility functions.
UR(WR) = max
ci
∑
i
νiEt
{
T∑
τ=t
βτv(c
i,0
τ ) + v
(
K∑
k=1
ci,kτ
)}
s.t.
∑
i
ci,at =
∑
i
yit +
K∑
k=1
Dkt = W
R
t for all t = 1, ..., T.
Clearly one can also in this case interchange the summation across agents with that
across time periods and across states of the information filtration. It follows that the
representative investor inherits the separability from the individual investors.
This last step of the argument is also true for case (iii). However, in this case the
preceeding step is not so immediate: Condition (B) on the assets’ dividends is no longer
sufficient to argue that any consumption stream (c0, c1, ..., cK) can be attained through
a dynamic trading strategy. The set of attainable consumption streams now depend on
the asset prices:
ci,kτ = D
k
τ θ
i,k
τ−1 + p
k
τ
(
θi,kτ−1 − θi,kτ
)
As Magill and Quinzii (1996) show, in general this difficulty can destroy Pareto
efficiency. However in the case of identical and homothetic preferences, which is the
case we consider in this paper, one can still show a Pareto efficiency property and the
aggregation argument works.11 The Pareto effiency concept has to be constrained so
that the alternative allocations that are compared to the financial market allocations
are determined by the same trading possibilities as the asset markets offer.
We conclude that the separability properties given in case (i) and (ii) aggregate for
any degree of heterogeneity of the agents while the third case (iii) holds only for investors
with identical constant relative risk aversion.
11This is case (b) of Magill and Quinzii (1996), page 270.
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